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Abstract
This paper examines the role of religious denomination for human capital forma-
tion. We employ a unique data set which covers, inter alia, information on numer-
ous measures of school inputs in 169 Swiss districts for the years 1871/72, 1881/82
and 1894/95, marks from pedagogical examinations of conscripts (1875-1903), and
results from political referenda to capture conservative or progressive values in addi-
tion to the cultural characteristics language and religion. Catholic districts show on
average signicantly lower educational performance than Protestant districts. How-
ever, accounting for other sociocultural characteristics qualies the role of religion
for educational production. The evidence suggests that Catholicism is harmful only
in a conservative milieu. We also exploit information on absenteeism of pupils from
school to separate provision of schooling from use of schooling.
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1 Introduction
Economists have recently regained considerable interests in the role of religion and other
cultural traits for the process of economic development (e.g. Barro and McCleary, 2003,
2006; Tabellini, 2005; Ashraf and Galor, 2007; Iyer, 2007; Doepke and Zilibotti, forth-
coming). The literature has been initiated by Weber (1905), who argued that religious
beliefs matter for professional attitudes and savings. More specically, he suggested that
Protestant regions have grown faster than Catholic regions due to Protestant work ethic
and capital accumulation.1
This research examines a related but relatively neglected channel through which re-
ligious denomination and other sociocultural characteristics may a¤ect economic devel-
opment: human capital formation.2 For instance, Becker and Woessmann (2007) nd a
signicant positive e¤ect of Protestantism on literacy in late 19-th century Prussia, while
other economic outcomes are a¤ected by religion only through literacy. The analysis
presented in this paper looks at the interaction of religion with other sociocultural char-
acteristics. We employ historical data from Swiss districts which provide us with a unique
opportunity to examine this interaction during the second phase of industrialization. This
opportunity stems from the recognition that, despite its smallness, Switzerland is extraor-
dinarily diverse in many respects relevant for our study. Besides its sociocultural diversity
(four o¢ cial languages, large variation in religious denomination, occupational structure
and political attitudes), there is a large disparity in school inputs across districts, thanks
to the responsibility for primary school nance and tax authority on the municipal level.
At the same time, Switzerland is characterized by a common institutional framework.
In particular, our measures of educational performance are derived from the nationwide
1See Iannaccone (1998, p. 1474 ¤.) for a critical review of this hypothesis. A new twist is brought
in by Doepke and Zilibotti (forthcoming). They look at the evolution of Protestant values in interaction
with occupational choice.
2Empirical evidence on the long-run e¤ects of education attributes a fundamental role to human
capital for the transition towards, and the development of a modern economy. The evidence suggests
that human capital has a causal e¤ect on potential growth factors such as property rights institutions
(Glaeser et al., 2004), democratization (Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer, 2007), social capital (Tabellini,
2005), and technological innovation (Mokyr, 2005). In a recent paper employing a new data series,
Cohen and Soto (2007) also nd a large positive impact of educational attainment on growth in standard
cross-country growth regressions and in panel estimates for the 1960-2000 period.
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examination of conscripts in standardized tests.
The long history of a direct-democratic political system in Switzerland provides us
with the opportunity to go beyond characterizing the cultural environment by religion
or language. We employ voting results of three historical federal referenda to capture
political attitudes: on easing restrictions for civil marriage held in 1875, on the Factory
Lawwhich imposed work regulations including the prohibition of child labor in 1877,
and on the re-introduction of the death penalty in 1879. The issue at stake in these three
referenda is that voting behavior reveals more or less conservative or progressive political
views. Support of civil marriage reveals a political attitude in favor of secularization. The
Factory Law introduced a progressive economic reform revealing a non-conservative
political attitude in its supporters, whereas support of the death penalty is generally
associated with conservatism.3
The main hypothesis we advance in this paper is as follows: Although Catholic dis-
tricts show, on average, signicantly lower educational performance than Protestant dis-
tricts, the role of religious denomination for the educational production process is largely
modied if one accounts for other cultural characteristics interacting with religion. The
evidence suggests that Catholicism loses its importance for educational production in a
non-conservative milieu supporting secularization and work regulations. Moreover, we
nd that religious denomination played a minor role for educational performance when
there was little support for the death penalty. Catholicism is particularly harmful if
the agricultural labor share is high. This suggests that religious denomination ceases to
matter for human capital formation if the economy is su¢ ciently advanced. Figure 1
illustrates the central message derived from our empirical analysis. The left boxes show
that in the sample of districts where a majority rejected the referenda on easing civil
marriage, the Catholic districts had a considerable higher share of low performers in the
conscriptspedagogical examinations than Protestants. In contrast to this, the results of
the districts in which a majority approved the referendum on easing civil marriage (right
boxes) reveal no such relation between religious denomination and educational outcome.
3All referenda were accepted by small margins. However, there was a very large variation of voting
results across districts. (See section 4 for details.)
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Our results suggest that reducing the sociocultural environment to religious denom-
ination - and attributing to it the decisive role for education or long-run development -
may be misleading. This is consistent with anecdotal historical evidence from the public
debate on education and secularization which points to prominent liberal and conservative
voices from both religious groups. As documented in Späni (1999), conservative Protes-
tant priests opposed liberal promoters of educational reforms, and liberal Catholics faced
conservative forces against educational reform. In the public debate about secularization,
the editors of a conservative Catholic periodical explicitly warn against liberal Catholics
while speculating that conservative Protestants may be allies - though unreliable.4 From
a more general point of view, our results echo the recent warning of Sen (2007), who
argues that individuals have plural identities and that characterizations of societies along
4In a memorandum proposing the formation of a "catholic-conservative cantonal, district, and mu-
nicipal committee" against the further secularization of the constitution, they emphasize: "We have so
far referred to the conservative-catholic politicians only; from the liberal Catholics we actually do not
expect anything [...] Conservative, honest thinking Protestants [...] are isolated and without inuence
on the public life and goings [...] unless it could be achieved to unify the conservative and truly acquies-
cent Protestants in order to prevent an irreligious direction of the revision of the federal constitution".
(Schweizer Blätter, 1871, p. 353f., own translation)
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a singular dimension, such as religion, lead to inferior policy outcomes. This also implies
that societies may not be doomed to economic failure due to their dominant religion. It
is rather the plurality of identity reected by political beliefs, language, occupation, place
of residence, among other things, which, in addition to religious beliefs, should be taken
seriously. Our data allows us to do exactly this.
Since the seminal work of Mincer (1958) and Becker (1964), there is a huge body of
research which aims to identify the determinants of educational success. In view of the
apparent importance of human capital formation for economic growth, it is not surprising
that, for instance, the results of the OECD Programme for International Student As-
sessment (PISA) meets with considerable interest both from the research and the policy
side.5 In Switzerland, at the turn of the 19th Century, there was a similar wave of in-
terest in education and performance, triggered by attempts to harmonize the cantonal
education systems (Zimmer, 2003). In 1874, the constitutional reform placed the re-
sponsibility for primary education on the cantonal and municipal level, while nationwide
quality control remained an issue. To overcome the problem, the Federal Council tried
to implement an inspection system under federal authority. This attempt did not meet
with general approval and, in 1882, was rejected in a referendum. But as an alternative
to the inspection system, the government could use the pedagogical examinations of con-
scripts (implemented in 1875) to e¤ectively monitor di¤erences in regional performance
(Mattmüller, 1982). The examinations were based on standardized tests and covered the
whole male population. The resulting marks were published in annual rankings, debated,
and subjected to inter-regional comparison.
We measure educational success by conscriptsmarks in the pedagogical examinations
on reading, essay, numeracy and Swiss history. Our set of explanatory variables includes
numerous measures of school inputs which have been suggested by the literature on edu-
cational production, such as expenditure per pupil, school capital per pupil, school weeks,
pupil/teacher-ratio, teacherstraining, age, gender, and length of service. The data set
covers information on schools in 169 Swiss districts for the years 1871/72, 1881/82, and
5The PISA studies assess scientic, reading and mathematical literacy in a three-yearly survey (2000,
2003, 2006...) of 15-year-olds in the principal industrialised countries. See www.pisa.oecd.org/.
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1894/95. As already stressed, we are interested in the e¤ects of a rich set of sociocultural
characteristics on educational outcomes, while controlling for school inputs. This partic-
ularly allows us to gain di¤erentiated insights on whether and how religion plays a role
for shaping human capital formation.
In addition, we are able to exploit information on pupilsabsenteeism from school to
analyze its e¤ect on the results of pedagogical examinations. Our identication strategy
is to instrument the number of days pupils are absent from school by the distance of
family homes to schools in a district. This allows us to separate the e¤ect of schooling
from the use of schooling (school attendance). The analysis of absenteeism leads to
further new insights on the potential determinants of educational outcomes. For instance,
we nd that the e¤ect of religious denomination on conscriptsperformance through ab-
senteeism is the opposite of its e¤ect for given absenteeism. Namely, catholic districts
show signicantly higher discipline in school attendance, which thereby positively a¤ects
educational outcome through this channel. However, the evidence on the interaction with
other sociocultural attributes suggests that also with respect to absenteeism, Catholicism
plays a negligible role in a culturally progressive and non-conservative milieu. Moreover,
we nd that a higher share of female teachers raises absenteeism, while a higher share of
clerical teachers reduces it. But these teacher characteristics turn out to be insignicant
for educational success when holding absenteeism constant. Not controlling for school
attendance may thus lead to the deceptive conclusion that males or clerics are better
teachers.
Finally, explicitly modelling school participation allows us to dig into the mechanics of
the so-called quality-quantity trade-o¤which is prominently used in basically all theories
of demographic transition and human capital formation (e.g. Galor and Weil, 2000;
Galor and Moav, 2002; Doepke and de la Croix, 2003, amongst others).6 We nd that a
higher number of children in a district lowers average educational performance. The e¤ect
appears to work by reducing school attendance and by decreasing school expenditure. This
is consistent with the hypothesis that parents with more children nd it more costly to
send them to school. In contrast, the evidence does not suggest that a higher number of
6For a survey, see Galor (2005).
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children per household implies less learning at home, for given school attendance.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the advancements of our paper
with respect to the related literature. Section 3 provides the theoretical considerations
from which we derive our estimation model. The data is described in section 4, where
correlations between important variables are also discussed. Section 5 provides the main
results. The last section recapitulates the main conclusions.
2 Related Literature
Our research combines the literature on educational production with the literature on
the role of religion and culture for economic development, specically for human capital
formation.
Barro andMcCleary (2003, 2006) present instrumental variable estimates of the impact
of religious beliefs on economic development by using a broad panel of countries. They
nd that belief in both heaven and hell positively a¤ect GDP growth, while monthly
church attendance has the opposite e¤ect.7 Grier (1997) focusses on ex-colonies, suggest-
ing that Protestantism is positively associated with economic growth. Guiso, Sapienza and
Zingales (2006) address more specically the Weberian hypothesis that religious denom-
ination determines preferences for thrift in cross-country evidence and nd statistically
signicant but relatively small e¤ects. Closer to our paper, Borooah and Iyer (2005) esti-
mate how the probability of primary school enrollment in India depends on religion. Their
evidence suggests that Muslim children had lower probability of enrollment than Hindus,
where Muslim boys derive higher benet than Hindu boys if the mother is laborer and
Muslim girls derive less benet than Hindu girls if household assets are high. By contrast,
we examine   for Switzerland in the 19th century   the e¤ect of religious (Christian)
denomination on educational test results rather than school enrollment. Moreover, we
allow for interactions of religion with political attitudes and sectoral structure to capture
7Related to this, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) show for the US that education is positively correlated
with church attendance (as well as with other indicators of social activity, which are themselves related to
church attendance) and negatively with religious beliefs. Barro and McCleary (2003) consider in addition
how church attendance determines religious beliefs.
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the cultural environment more comprehensively. Becker and Woessmann (2007) nd a
signicant impact of Protestantism on literacy in late 19th-century Prussia. We comple-
ment their results in nding that religious denomination is correlated also with results of
pedagogical examinations. However, we argue that the benecial e¤ects of Protestantism
are signicantly weakened or non-existent in a progressive and non-conservative milieu
as reected in results of federal referenda. Our ndings therefore qualify the impact of
religious denomination by emphasizing its interaction with other cultural traits in order
to determine educational outcomes. Moreover, we are able to control for a large variety
of school inputs and for absenteeism from school. This allows us to mitigate an omitted
variable bias and to shed light on channels through which sociocultural factors and public
education policy a¤ect human capital formation.
We are not aware of any study in the vast literature on educational production which
accounts for sociocultural characteristics or is able to use information on absenteeism of
pupils from school. The literature on the e¤ects of school resources on standardized test
scores for the US is reviewed, inter alia, by Hanushek (1986, 1996, 2002) and Greenwald,
Hedges and Laine (1996). Woessmann (2005) provides a detailed account of evidence
from Western European countries. The reviews provide mixed conclusions about the
e¤ectiveness of school resources in raising test scores.8 For instance, many OLS estimates
with school level-data suggest that raising school expenditure to lower the pupil-teacher
ratio has little impact on test scores. As theoretically shown by Lazear (2001), class
size e¤ects on individual test scores are biased towards zero when behavior of students is
not controlled for and low-performing pupils are put into smaller classes. In our paper,
this problem is substantially reduced due to the aggregate nature of the data. Hanushek,
Rivkin and Taylor (1996) argue that existing studies using state-level or district-level data
show higher e¤ects of school resources on test scores but may deliver biased estimates when
not controlling for non-school district or state characteristics. Fortunately, our data set
allows us to include a rich set of non-school variables which are likely to be correlated with
8There has recently emerged a literature on the e¤ects of specic educational programs on test scores
using randomized experiments in developing countries (a survey is provided by Kremer, 2003). For
instance, Banerjee et al. (2005) nd that in public schools in Indian slums the hiring of young women to
help underperforming children on basic skills (literacy and numeracy) or the use of a computer-assisted
learning program with educational games turned out to be quite e¤ective.
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attitudes towards education and the learning environment, a¤ecting both the educational
production process for given school attendance and through a change in absenteeism. We
nd that school resources, and teacher quality in particular, matter. We are careful to
interpret the results by making use of theoretical considerations (in section 3) which take
into account the public budget constraint for educational spending. Besides incorporating
sociocultural factors, our main innovation for estimating educational production is to
exploit information on absenteeism. This takes into account that school attendance is a
choice variable which may depend on both sociocultural factors and school resources, in
turn a¤ecting educational outcomes.
3 Theoretical Considerations
We consider primary education. Even though primary education was compulsory in
Switzerland during the time period under consideration, there was apparently signicant
discretion by pupils or parents in choosing school attendance, as revealed by our data.9
We account for this by endogenously explaining absenteeism. Moreover, human capital
acquisition in schools may be complemented by e¤orts at home (learning e¤orts of pupils
and parentssupport). In sum, households (of parents and pupils) can inuence educa-
tional production by voting over the level of public expenditure, by school attendance and
by home e¤orts. The following theoretical model of human capital formation accounts
for these three channels. First, we characterize the outcome of the education system by
analyzing economically optimal behavior of the representative household with respect to
the three variables public school expenditure, school attendance and home e¤ort. Then
we extend the model to account for religion e¤ects and other cultural attitudes.
3.1 Educational production
Human capital, h, depends on school quality, Z, on home e¤orts, e, and on school atten-
dance, E  1   a, where a is the fraction of teaching time that a pupil is absent from
9Compulsory schooling was introduced on a national level in 1874. Thus, regarding the time period
under consideration, compulsory schooling had not yet become a matter of course and enforcement was
partially imperfect.
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school. While Z represents the supply of educational services by schools, attendance E
reects the use of school services by the household. Absenteeism reduces the e¤ective use
of school services one to one. Private e¤ort e captures, for instance, the support of parents
for the education of their children at home. We assume that home e¤orts complement
the used school services, EZ, according to a Cobb-Douglas function
h = e1 {[EZ]{, 0 < { < 1: (1)
The quality of education provided by schools depends on school inputs. We do not
distinguish between classes and school, and assume that school inputs are the same for
each pupil within a district. In our data set, the observable school inputs are the number
of school weeks per year, s, the number of pupils in a class, m, and capital costs (e.g.
for school buildings) per pupil, k. We also observe a vector T of teacher characteris-
tics including formal education, gender, age, and experience of a teacher. In addition,
unobserved variations in school inputs may a¤ect school quality. For instance, teacher
e¤orts or the quality of school managements can vary across districts. In our data, we
do not observe teacher remuneration aggregated at the district level to account for such
e¤ects. However, we have data on total public spending per pupil, g. This allows us to
infer the proportions of spending on unobserved inputs from the public budget constraint.
The spending explained by observable inputs is given by the sum of capital and teacher
costs.10
k +
W (T)  s
m
 (z), (2)
where W (T) represents the wage component (for a teacher per school week) related to
observable teacher characteristics. z is the vector of observable school inputs (including
the observable teacher characteristics). We assume that the share of spending which is
not explained by observable inputs works like a quality augmenting factor. For instance,
additional spending on teacher wages induces more able individuals to choose the teacher
occupation, or, reecting standard e¢ ciency wage arguments, may trigger higher e¤ort
10We implicitly assume that extending school weeks, s, is consequential for the public budget only
through a¤ecting wage costs for teachers. Also note that the inverse of class size, 1=m, is the number of
teachers per pupil.
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provision and less turnover of teachers. Formally, let q(z) be the technology relating
observed school inputs to output of school services per pupil. Then,
Z = q(z) (1 + !) , (3)
where
! =
g   (z)
(z)
(4)
is the ratio of unexplained to explained school expenditure. Using this in (1), we have
h = e1 {E{g{Q (z) , (5)
Q (z)  [q (z) =(z)]{. In sum, the e¤ect of school resources on human capital can be
decomposed in two factors: The level of resources available to schools, given by public
school spending g, and the expenditure structure according to which total expenditure is
distributed over di¤erent inputs. The latter factor is captured by z. Given the allocation
on the observed inputs, z, school expenditure g positively a¤ects school quality and thus
human capital h. For a given g, its allocation on inputs z potentially a¤ect school quality
and human capital in two opposing ways. For instance, higher capital spending per
pupil positively a¤ects Z since it leads to a better learning infrastructure in school (this
is reected by q(z)). However, for a given per pupil expenditure g, it goes along with
a reduction in other inputs, including the unobserved inputs, and thereby may impede
school quality.11
3.2 The Economic Determinants of Educational Production
At rst, we characterize the provision of education if household behavior is based on
purely economic considerations. This means that the only motive for acquiring human
capital is its potential to generate income. Assume that the gross income earned by an
11Similarly, although a higher class size (m) leads to a deterioration of the learning environment (e.g.
Lazear, 2001), it also allows to pay higher wage rates for teachers when holding the other school inputs
constant, thereby possibly raising school quality by increasing teacher quality. Similar arguments apply
to school weeks (s).
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agent with human capital h equals Ah, where A reects the state of development of the
considered economy. (In the empirical analysis, we assume that A is negatively related
to the agricultural labor share in a district.) Then, the representative households net
income is given by
c = Ah  g. (6)
For acquiring h the household incurs, in addition to the cost of public school inputs, e¤ort
e at home and the e¤ort required for school attendance, E. We assume that total e¤ort
costs are given by
(e; E) = ' [e+ (1 + d)E] , (7)
where ' > 0. Parameter d  0 denotes the distance of a pupil to its school.12 The
economic preferences of the household are given by the utility function:13
U = log(c)  (e; E). (8)
In sum, for a given public expenditure level g, the representative household of a district
chooses home support e and attendance E by solving
maxU subject to (5)-(7). (9)
Moreover, as a voter, the representative household chooses g according to (9). While the
level of public school expenditure is determined by the voters, the allocation of school
budgets on the di¤erent school inputs is controlled by the school administration. The
voter takes the structure of inputs given. To x ideas, we assume that the voter observes
input vector z before voting over the school budget g and can infer the expenditure
structure from z.14 As a result, education in a district is characterized by the following
12One straightforward interpretation is that e and (1 + d)E is the time spent on home e¤ort and
attendance, respectively.
13We did the analysis for more general cost and utility functions. The essential results remain valid.
More specically, we considered the following specications:  (e;E) = '

e + (1 + d)E

; ' > 0; 1  ;
and U = u(c)   (e;E) ; u0 > 0; u00(c) < 0.
14This is possible if expenditure shares and input prices are invariant with respect to the scale of
educational production. Formally, let  denote the scale of educational production and z0 be the vector
of the weights of the di¤erent inputs. Then q(z) = q(z0) and (z) = (z0). Thus, Z = gQ(z) =
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properties.
Proposition 1 Assume that educational production is determined by economic motives
according to (9). Then, i) absenteeism increases with distance to school, whereas home
support is invariant with respect to distance. ii) Public expenditure g is increasing in A.
Proof: Appendix A.
Part (i) shows that e¤ort allocation of households changes in favor of school attendance
if the distance to school declines. The fact that home support doesnt depend on distance
to school ensures that educational performance   given by (5)   is unrelated to d after
controlling for absenteeism (a = 1   E) and per pupil spending (g). Part (i) therefore
provides a theoretical foundation to use distance to school as an instrumental variable for
absenteeism in our empirical analysis. Part (ii) predicts that school expenditure per pupil
is higher in economically more advanced districts than in less developed districts.
3.3 Accounting for Cultural Attitudes
To account for the fact that cultural attitudes may play a role in the education system,
we extend household preferences by two components and assume that utility is given by
V = U +  log(h)   (1  E),  > 0;  > 0: (10)
The term  log(h) captures the (culturally rooted) value assigned to education. For in-
stance, all other things equal,  may be higher in a Protestant district than in a Catholic
district, possibly reecting a specic form of Weberian Protestant ethic which a¤ects e¤ort
provision in education.15 More generally,  is a function of the sociocultural characteris-
tics of a district. Besides religious denomination, the values captured by the results from
the political referenda can a¤ect education. In the empirical analysis, we are particularly
interested in the question on how political attitudes revealing liberal or conservative val-
ues modify the role of religious denomination on absenteeism, home support and school
g [q(z)=(z)]
{
= g [q(z0)=(z0)]
{.
15In Switzerland, at the time we consider, almost everybody was either Catholic or Protestant, and
the distribution of the share of Catholics across districts centered close the extreme values 0 and 1.
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expenditure. Conservative political views are reected in the support of the death penalty
whereas liberal views are reected in the support of civil marriage (secularization) and
progressive work regulations. Cultural di¤erences between districts may also be related
to language (German, French, Italian and Rhaeto-Romanic in the Swiss context) or, im-
portantly, to interactions between religious denomination and political attitudes. In the
empirical analysis, sociocultural district characteristics are represented by vector x; for-
mally,  = ~(x; A).
The term  (1 E) captures heterogeneity in the attitude towards school attendance.
One reason for variation in this attitude may be heterogeneity in internalized norm com-
pliance. Other reasons are di¤erent cultures of sanctioning absence from school, or
that people from di¤erent backgrounds react di¤erently to sanctions. For instance, cler-
ical teachers may be stricter than laypersons; pupils may fear male teachers more than
females; punishments in Catholic districts or in rural environments may be harder than
in Protestant or urban districts; or respect of authority and obedience di¤er across mi-
lieus. We account for such di¤erences in the simplest possible way by assuming that the
disutility of absence is proportional to absenteeism, a = 1 E. Parameter   0 reects
both the strength of sanctions and the fear of sanctions. As the examples showed,  may
vary with both school characteristics, in particular teacher characteristics, and non-school
characteristics of a district. Formally,  = ~ (x; z; A). Under the preferences represented
by (10), private e¤ort, attendance and educational performance are biased as follows -
compared to the optimal program based exclusively on the economic values of human
capital.
Proposition 2 If educational production is determined by economic and cultural motives
according to (10) we have in addition to part (i) and part (ii) of Proposition 1 the following
e¤ects: i) Home support is increasing in  and invariant with respect to  . Absenteeism
is decreasing in both  and  . ii) Spending per pupil is positively related to home support
and school attendance and therefore also rises with  and, if there is absenteeism, also
with  . In addition, an increase in  has a direct positive e¤ect on g.
Proof: Appendix A.
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Part i) shows that heterogeneity in the cultural attitudes towards schooling leads to
a bias in private e¤ort allocation. Part ii) shows how cultural motives can a¤ect school
expenditures. A positive  means that absence from school has cultural costs - for
instance, stricter sanctions of absenteeism by teachers or more respect of discipline. In
contrast, a positive  reects cultural attitudes which attribute a positive value to human
capital, in addition to its economic value. According to part (i), school attendance rises
with both higher sanctions for absenteeism and a higher value assigned to education.
Home support is positively related to the latter but does not depend on the former.
Religion, political values and other sociocultural characteristics can a¤ect the outcome
of the education system through home support, school attendance and expenditure in
di¤erent directions. For instance, in Protestant districts, the economic determinants of
educational choices may be associated with a positive cultural valuation of human capital,
whereas in districts with many clerical teachers respect of discipline may be high regardless
of the value of human capital. According to Proposition 2, in the rst type of district,
we should expect better educational performance through more home support (part i)
as well as higher public spending (part ii) than in a Catholic district, especially if these
Catholic inhabitants hold conservative political values (see introduction). In the later
type of districts, we should expect high school attendance (part i). As this implies more
use of school services, also the support of school spending may rise, ceteris paribus (part
ii).
4 Data
4.1 Pedagogical Examinations
As the output measure of primary school performance, we use the results of the peda-
gogical examinations of conscripts at the district level (ve year averages) for the periods
1875-79, 1885-89. and 1899-1903.16 The pedagogical examinations of conscripts had been
introduced in several cantons as early as the 1850s to check the e¢ ciency of their school
16Data sources are provided in Appendix B.
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systems. The idea of surveying the output of education denitely won recognition with
the introduction of those early cantonal examinations (Lustenberger, 1996, p. 25-34; Lus-
tenberger 1999, p. 364f). The new federal constitution of 1874 demanded adequate
education, but provided no legal background for controls by the federation. The only
means to check the cantonal education systems was to implement pedagogical examina-
tions in the military service, which was compulsory for every male citizen. With the new
constitution, the federal state had also received more competence in the military sector. It
immediately installed a new military law providing standards for the di¤erent branches of
service, including a paragraph with rules for the pedagogical examinations (April 1875).
With few exceptions, recruits had to undergo a standardized test in four subjects: reading,
essay-writing, mathematics (written and oral) as well as knowledge of Swiss history and
constitution (Zimmer, 2003, p. 181).17 In the rst four years (1875 to 1879), the grades
ranged from 1 (very good) to 4 (poor), and thereafter from 1 to 5. Those recruits who
did poorly in more than one subject (i.e. marks 4 to 5) were compelled to take repetition
courses during military training.
During the next four decades, the pedagogical examinations were steadily improved
according to new pedagogical and statistical requirements. The examiners themselves
might have formed a certain risk of distorting the results, but precautions were taken:
The experts were not allowed to take tests in the canton they came from; all the experts
met once a year to set standards securing the uniformity of evaluation, and for the same
reason, one of them had to attend all the tests in the di¤erent divisions; guidance papers
were framed, and preparation courses for experts and their assistants introduced. Uni-
formity and comparability of results were major concerns throughout the years of testing
(Lustenberger, 1996, p. 58-66).
17Recruits with secondary education (i.e. at least one, or from 1880 onwards two years of higher
education) were not required to take the test. If they were able to provide acceptable records, they were
automatically assigned the best grade. However, only few of the higher educated conscripts seemed to
make use of this possibility. In 1886, only 235 out of 24059 tested recruits were evaluated according to
their school reports. Blind, deaf or mentally disabled conscripts were freed from the tests, as well, and
accordingly do not appear in the results at all.
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4.2 School Statistics
The rst of a series of four extensive collections of regional education statistics was pub-
lished by Hermann Kinkelin (1875), initiated by the Federal Department of Home A¤airs
as a contribution to the World Exhibition in Vienna in 1873. On the occasion of the rst
National Exhibition 1883 in Zurich, a second collection was compiled by Johann Kaspar
Grob (1883). In 1894/1895, Albert Huber was assigned to renew the school statistics
for the National Exhibition 1896 in Geneva (Huber, 1897), and again in 1911/12 for the
National Exhibition in Bern 1914 (Huber and Bay, 1915). The exhibitions legitimated
the collection of statistical material on education all over Switzerland, because federal
intervention in the school system was out of the question after the negative vote on the
secretary of education in 1882.
The data analyzed in our study cover the years 1871/72, 1881/82, and 1894/95.18
They provide information on pupils, teachers, budget, and facilities on the level of the
individual schools. The results are aggregated by districts, which constitute the base of
our data set. Several smaller cantons are not subdivided into districts,19 so either the
available municipal data or the cantonal totals were taken. There are 156 observations
for 1871/72, 168 observations for 1881/82 and 169 observations for 1894/95.20
The statistics contain detailed information on the budget of the schools. From the bud-
get information, we use total annual real school expenditure per pupil in logs (Expenditure
[log g])21 and annual real capital stock per pupil in logs (Capital [log k]).22 Further infor-
mation on the quality of the learning environment is provided by the pupil-teacher ratio
(ClassSize [logm]) and the school weeks (Weeks [s]).
Absenteeism is measured by the number of school days per year a pupil is absent from
18The data refers to a school year which begins/ends in spring. We cannot use the data from 1911/12,
because the pedagogical examinations stopped in 1913.
19Obwalden, Nidwalden, Glarus, Zug and Appenzell Innerrhoden in all school statistics; Luzern in
1881/82, and Uri in 1894/95.
20For 1871/72, the data for the canton Valais on the district level are incomplete. For 1881/82 data
for Saanen (canton Bern) is missing.
21Throughout, the variable name in squared parenthesis refers to the notation in section 3; we also
indicate when we employ logs.
22The deator is a consumer price index (1913=100) on the national level from Ritzmann-Blickenstorfer
and Siegenthaler (1996, Table Q1a; Konsumdeator).
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school in logs. The corresponding variable Absenteeism [log a] can be interpreted as a
measure for the degree of utilization of the supply of school services. From 1881/82, the
data set contains information about the number of pupils with a long distance from home
to school. Grob (1883) started to collect these data as a potential reason for absenteeism.
The variable Distance [d] is the share of pupils with a distance of more than 3 km to
school (1881/82) and more than 2.5 km (1894/95). Since we do not have data for 1871/72,
we assume that the share is the same as in 1881/82.
Teachers are characterized by their training, status (cleric or layperson), gender, age
and length of service. The clerical teachers (their share is denoted by Clerics) either
belonged to a religious order or worked in a parish; vocational education could either
be taken at university, teacher training seminars, grammar schools, in courses, or simply
with nishing primary school and via othertraining such as self-study. We categorize
primary school, courses and otheras inadequate training; the fraction of teachers falling
in this category is denoted by PoorTr. The variable Age > 40 represents the share of
teachers older than 40 years, and Experience > 20 measures the share of teachers with
more than 20 years of service. Female refers to the fraction of female teachers.
4.3 Other Control Variables
The main source of the other control variables is the Swiss census. Since 1860, the census
was reiterated every ten years, with the exception of 1888 (instead of 1890). Our census
data cover the years 1870, 1880, and 1888. For every district, we have information on
the proportion of population employed in the primary sector (Primary []),23 as well as
the share of Catholics (Catholics) and majority language (measured by dummy variables
German, French, Italian, Romanic). As a measure of family structure, we calculated
the ratio of children between 0 and 15 years to total population (Children [n]).
For measuring the prevalence of conservative or progressive attitudes, we use district
data of yes-votes on three referenda:24 The Factory Law (Fabrikgesetz) 1877, the
23For interpretation reasons, the variable Primary [] measures the mean subtracted agricultural labor
share.
24For interpretation reasons, variables on voting behavior measure the share of yes-votes minus the
mean share of yes-votes.
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referendum on the introduction of the civil marriage 1875, and the referendum on the re-
introduction of the death penalty in 1879.25 The Factory Law(Y esFactory) prohibited
child labor for children younger than 14 years, and consequently enabled compulsory
school attendance (Studer, 2005).26 The fraction of voters supporting the introduction
of civil marriage (Y esCivil) captures attitude in favor of secularization, which in turn
may be conducive to non-religious education. The optional referendum was only accepted
due to the majority of the citizens, whereas the majority of the cantons dismissed it.27
The compulsory referendum on the reintroduction of the death penalty, which had been
banned by the 1874 constitution, was nearly as controversial.28 Distinctions between the
conservative and progressive regions could clearly be seen in the voting behavior. We
interpret the fraction of voters supporting death penalty (Y esDeath) as a measure of
political conservatism and the fraction of voters supporting the factory law (Y esFactory)
and the introduction of civil marriage (Y esCivil) as a measure of prevalence of progressive
political attitudes.29
4.4 Summary Statistics and Correlations
Tab. 1 provides summary statistics of important variables employed in the panel data
analysis of the coming section. The variation in the data is remarkable. For instance, the
average of the fractions of conscripts who failed in the tests on reading, essay writing,
math and history (LowPerf ) ranges from 1.3 to 70 percent, with a standard deviation of
25The data set is based on a collection by Rolf Nef and Peter Gilg, and will be published in the near
future by SIDOS (www.sidos.ch). We are grateful to Christian Bollinger for allowing us access.
26The Factory Lawwas accepted by a very narrow majority. Citizens: 179915 : 170140; cantons
14 : 8 (Ritzmann-Blickenstorfer and Siegenthaler, 1996, Table X10).
27Citizens: 211336 : 203437; cantons: 9.5 : 12.5 (Ritzmann-Blickenstorfer and Siegenthaler, 1996,
Table X10). The federal constitution of 1848 required a compulsory referendum on constitution issues,
with both the majority of yes-votes by the cantons (Ständemehr) and the majority of yes-votes by the
citizens (Volksmehr) for acceptance. In the revision of 1874, the optional referendum on laws and decisions
was institutionalized (Gilg, 2005), requiring only a majority of yes-votes by the citizens.
28Citizens: 198335 : 179251; cantons: 14 : 8 (Ritzmann-Blickenstorfer and Siegenthaler, 1996, Table
X10).
29To check robustness of our main results, we experimented with further control variables. To account
for possible human capital spillover e¤ects among households, we included the altitude of a district
(as spillovers may be lower in the mountains where the population is detached from bigger cities) and
population density in our regressions. The e¤ects of changes in these variables almost always turn out to
be insignicant and leave other coe¢ cients basically unchanged. So we did not include the variables in
the reported regressions.
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15.5.
<Table 1>
The voting results from the three referenda also di¤ered substantially across districts,
which indicates considerable cultural divisions within Switzerland. For instance, in Goms
(canton Valais) there were 1201:1 votes against and in Biel (canton Bern) 1909:49 votes
in favor of civil marriage. Similarly, in Raron (canton Valais), we nd 1215:4 in favor
and in La-Chaux-de-Fonds (canton Neuchâtel) 2581:220 votes against the death penalty.
Similar extreme di¤erences can be found for the referendum about the Factory Law.
The standard deviations of the fraction of yes-votes in the three referenda all exceed 20
percentage points.
There were also large di¤erences in school inputs. For instance, some districts had
more than twice as many school weeks than others, and the standard deviation in the
data is six weeks. Spending per pupil di¤ered substantially, too. Moreover, some districts
had a large fraction of poorly trained, experienced or older teachers while others had
none of those teachers. Finally, in some districts, there were no female or clerical teachers
whereas the large majority of teachers had these characteristics in others.
<Table 2>
Tab. 2 provides the correlation coe¢ cients among cultural indicators on the one hand
(panel (a)) and between the share of Catholics (Catholics) and other important (non-
cultural) indicators on the other hand (panel (b)). Panel (a) shows that Catholics was
positively correlated with the fraction of supporters of the death penalty and negatively
with the support of civil marriage. Correlations were quite strong but not near-perfect,
suggesting that share of Catholics and yes-votes on these issues dont measure the same
cultural traits. Support of the Factory Lawwas barely related to the share of Catholics.
There is a rather high correlation between support of the death penalty and opposition
to civil marriage, which is consistent with the interpretation that these variables reect
conservativeattitudes. All three referenda, particularly on the Factory Lawhad more
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support in districts with German as majority language. The dummy variable German on
the other hand, is rather uncorrelated to religious denomination.
Panel (b) of Tab. 2 suggests that Catholicism is related to a higher fraction of con-
scripts who failed the tests. However, Catholicism is also negatively related to school
expenditure per pupil (Expenditure), which itself is correlated with performance in the
expected way. Catholicism is also more prevalent in districts where the agricultural labor
share (Primary) is high and the primary sector share is itself somewhat related to edu-
cational performance. Thus, it is not clear if a higher share of Catholics depresses school
performance when holding Expenditure and Primary (among other variables) constant.
There is a negative relationship between absenteeism from school and the share of
Catholics as well as between absenteeism and the fraction of agricultural workers in the
population. But absenteeism is seemingly unrelated to test performance. Finally, there is
no signicant correlation between the fraction of children and the share of low-performing
conscripts.
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Identication Strategy
Let i be the index of a district and denote time by t. The endogenous variable in our
empirical model is the share of low performing conscripts (educational outcome h). The
aim of the empirical section is to examine the e¤ects of culture, state of development and
political attitudes on the three factors determining the outcome of educational production:
Absenteeism, home supportand education expenditure. The state of development is
inversely measured by the employment share in agriculture, . Because we do not observe
the home support of a pupil (e), we estimate the following model suggested by (5) and the
theoretical result that home support depends on non-school district characteristics (use
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 = ~ (x; A) in part (i) of Proposition 2):
hi;t =0 + 1i;t 1 + x
0
i;t 1x + z
0
i;t 1z + 2 log gi;t 1+
3 log ai;t 1 + 4ni;t 1 +  0t + ui;t:
(11)
That is, we study whether the cultural variables, x, and the primary sector share, , a¤ect
the educational outcome for given expenditure per pupil, g, absenteeism, a, and school
characteristics, z.30 The vector z contains capital spending per pupil in logs (log k), class
size in logs (logm), the number of school weeks (s) and teachers characteristics (T):
gender (Female), status (Clerics), age (Age > 40), length of service (Experience > 20),
and training (PoorTr). Furthermore, to assess the possibility of a quality-quantity trade-
o¤as stressed by many authors, we control for the number of children, n. Finally, we
control for time xed e¤ects, . The vector of cultural variables, x, includes the language
dummies, voting results from the three referenda, the share of Catholics and (depending
on the model) interactions between the voting behavior / the agricultural labor share
and the Catholic share. Since we control for school quality and its use (attendance), the
coe¢ cients of vector x must reect e¤ects on educational outcome via the channel of
home support.
Because Absenteeism is an endogenous variable, a sole estimate of (11) may lead to
biased results.31 To account for this di¢ culty, we instrument Absenteeism (log a) by
the distance to school, d. Arguably, the distance to school has no independent e¤ect
on educational performance other than through absenteeism. (This is conrmed by our
theoretical analysis which showed that home support is independent of d.) Thus, at a rst
stage, we estimate the following model of absenteeism, suggested by part (i) of Proposition
2:
30The lag accounts for the fact that educational outcome is measured at recruitment and not during
schooling. See description of time structure in Table 3.
31For instance there may be an endogeneity bias because low-performers lose motivation to attend
school. At the same time, the instrumentation accounts for possible concerns regarding the quality of
absenteeism data. For 1871/72, Kinkelin (1875, p. Xf.) himself cautions against a careless use of the
numbers because of the lack of standards. By introducing cantonal regulations, the data quality in the
later surveys was improved.
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log ai;t =0 + 1i;t + x
0
i;tx + z
0
i;tz + 2 log gi;t+
3di;t + 4ni;t + 
0
t + "i;t;
(12)
and then use the instrumented Absenteeism to estimate (11).32 An advantage of this two
stage approach is that by computing the rst stage, we get an answer to the question on
how culture, x, and the agricultural labor share, , a¤ect attendance.
Our data set contains each variable at three points in time covering altogether about
30 years. Table 3 summarizes the time structure.
Tab. 3: Time structure.
Pedagogical
Examinations (hi;t)
School Statistics
(gi;t; ai;t; di;t; zi;t)
Census
(ni;t; i;t;xi;t)
t = 0 1871/72 1870
t = 1 1875-1879 1881/82 1880
t = 2 1885-1889 1894/95 1888
t = 3 1899-1903
For our measurement of educational performance, we consider ve-years-averages of
the performance of conscripts in the periods 1875-79 (t = 1), 1885-89 (t = 2), and 1899-
1903 (t = 3). The data on school resources and absenteeism are available for the years
1871/72 (t = 0), 1881/82 (t = 1), and 1894/95 (t = 2).33 The Catholic share, the majority
language, the number of children and the agricultural share come from the Census which
was undertook in 1870 (t = 0), 1880 (t = 1) and 1888 (t = 2).
The conventional calculation of standard errors relies on the assumption that the
error terms are independent and identically distributed. To tackle the problem that this
assumption might be violated in our case, we consider each district as a cluster group and
systematically calculate robust Huber/White standard errors which are adjusted for intra-
32A Hausman test clearly rejects the null hypothesis that the endogenous variable (Absenteeism) has
no deleterious e¤ect on the estimates of (11).
33The only exception is distance to school, d, for which we have no data in 1871/72, so we assign
t = 0; 1 to the year 1881/82 and t = 2 to 1894/95.
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cluster correlation.34 Under the assumption of uncorrelated between-cluster disturbances,
these robust variance estimates are unbiased (Williams, 2000).
In the next subsections, we present the estimates of the two stages. We are especially
interested in the e¤ects of religious denomination and whether these e¤ects are signi-
cantly modied by the voting behavior and the state of development (agricultural share).
In subsection 5.4, we additionally examine whether school expenditure per pupil depends
on the cultural milieu in a similar way as home support(suggested by Proposition 2).35
5.2 First Stage Results
Tab. 4 shows the results from the rst stage regressions. It conrms that our instrument
(Distance) is highly correlated with absenteeism from school.
<Table 4>
Column (1) suggests that in districts with a higher share of Catholics, as well as in
those with a higher agricultural labor share, pupils attend school more often (coe¢ cients
on Catholics and Primary are negative and signicant at the ten and one percent level,
respectively). A (purely) Catholic district has on average a 13 percent lower absenteeism
than a (purely) Protestant district. Evaluated at mean Absenteeism (= 14:4 days) this
corresponds to a di¤erence of two school days per year. (The mean number of school
days was 188 days per year, according to Tab. 1.) For a one standard deviation increase
in Primary, we estimate that absenteeism decreases by 12 (= 0:088  137:9) percent.
Thus, according to our theoretical considerations, we infer that either punishment of
absenteeism must be harder or the sensitivity to punishment must be higher in a rural,
Catholic district. Furthermore, we nd that the majority language plays a signicant
role. Francophone districts have signicantly more absenteeism. Moreover, absenteeism
rises with the number of children. This suggests that parents with more children nd it
34To account for possible spatial correlations, we furthermore calculated standard errors which are
adjusted for intra-cantonal clustering. However, this modication does not a¤ect the robustness of our
main results.
35Due to the lack of an appropriate instrument in our data we do not use instrumented expenditure per
pupil in the estimation of (11). However, instrumenting g is not as crucial as instrumenting absenteeism,
in particular as data quality is less of a concern.
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more costly to send them to school. The result reects a particular notion of a quality-
quantity trade-o¤. With respect to school inputs, column (1) reveals that absenteeism
increases in the number of mandatory school weeks. Moreover, absenteeism rises in the
share of female teachers and falls in that of clerical teachers. These results could reect
that the punishment of a male teacher is harder and that clerics may possess a higher
degree of authority. This shows that, without controlling for absenteeism in the second
stage, the estimates could lead to the wrong conclusion that males and clerics are better
teachers than females and non-clerics, respectively - although according to our results,
the e¤ect of these teacher characteristics on performance are entirely driven by the e¤ects
on school attendance.
Somewhat surprisingly at the rst glance, a higher fraction of teachers with poor
training is negatively associated with absenteeism, while the opposite applies if there is
higher per pupil spending. These results may merely reect, however, some measurement
error in the absenteeism variable, as already discussed. In fact, the evidence suggests that
teachers with better training and/or higher salary may have reported absenteeism more
frequently.36 When using the instrumented absenteeism variable at the second stage,
we more accurately account for the e¤ect of absenteeism on human capital formation
by partly correcting the potential measurement errors associated with di¤erent reporting
behavior of teachers. In addition to addressing potential reverse causality problems and
omitted variable bias, this constitutes a further reason why we instrument absenteeism.
In column (2), we additionally control for an interaction term between Catholics
and Primary. As we see, the estimated coe¢ cient of this interaction is negative and
signicant at the one percent level, whereas the direct Catholic e¤ect gets smaller and
insignicant. Thus, we nd a signicant di¤erence in absenteeism between Catholics and
Protestants only in districts where the agricultural share of labor is above its mean.37 In
columns (3)-(5), we analyze whether the voting behavior qualies the religion e¤ect. We
nd that all interactions between the Catholic share and the yes-votes on the referenda
36Recall from section 3 that a higher g indicates better school quality (e.g. related to the salary of
teachers) when holding the other school input variables in our data constant.
37Primary measures the agricultural labor share minus the mean agricultural labor share. Thus, in
an average rural district Primary is zero.
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are signicant at the 1 percent level. Catholic pupils are less absent only if they live in a
district where conservative political attitudes dominate (i.e. where the factory law and the
law on civil marriage were highly rejected or the capital punishment was highly approved).
To get a sense of how large the qualifying e¤ect of political attitudes can be, we consider
the extreme cases of voting behavior on the referendum on civil marriage. As you can
see from Table 1, extreme voting behavior really occurred. We estimate that a purely
Catholic district would have 89 (=  3:3  176:5  0:487) percent lower absenteeism than
a purely Protestant district if the law on civil marriage is fully rejected, whereas a purely
Catholic district would have 87 (=  3:3 + 176:5  0:513) percent higher absenteeism if
the law on civil marriage is fully approved.38 As a robustness check, we analyze, in
columns (6)-(8), whether there actually are two di¤erent variables (state of development
and political attitude) that qualify the e¤ect of religious denomination. After controlling
for the voting behavior and its interaction with the Catholic share, Catholics  Primary
remains signicantly negative at the one percent level. Furthermore, we nd that the
interaction between the Catholic share and the yes-votes on the Factory Lawand civil
marriage remains signicant (at least at the ve percent level).39 Overall, our ndings
suggest that the sign of the religion e¤ect on absenteeism depends on whether the district
is rural or whether conservative political attitudes prevail. When all three voting results
and their interactions with Catholics are included in the regression, and an F-test over
the joint signicance of the three interactions is run, the null hypothesis is rejected at the
one percent level (not reported in the Table). Hence the political attitude systematically
qualies the e¤ect of religion.
We emphasize in this paper that the voting behavior reects the prevalence of conser-
vatism which is   in addition to religion   another aspect of the plural cultural identities
of a society. In Table 2, we see that political attitudes and religion are correlated. Thus,
it could be the case that the signicance of the interaction terms are only driven by a
38Y esCivil is the di¤erence between the share of yes-votes and its mean (= 0:487). Thus a full rejection
implies Y esCivil =  0:487 and a full approval corresponds to Y esCivil = 0:513.
39For example we estimate that, given a mean agricultural share of labor, a purely Catholic district
has 63 (=  3:3  123:1  0:487) percent lower absenteeism than a purely Protestant district, if the law on
civil marriage is fully rejected, whereas a purely Catholic district has 60 (=  3:3 + 123:1  0:513) percent
higher absenteeism if the law on civil marriage is fully approved.
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non-linear Catholic e¤ect. This is tested in column (9). We nd that the coe¢ cient of
the squared Catholic share is not signicant   indicating there is indeed a factor di¤erent
from religion which drives our results.40
5.3 Second Stage Results
At the second stage, we estimate the e¤ects of school resources, attendance of school and
cultural variables on educational outcomes. Tab. 5 shows our ndings.
<Table 5>
As expected, school resources matter. In column (1), we estimate that for given
observable inputs, a 10 percent increase in expenditure reduces the share of low performing
conscripts by 0.75 percentage points. Teachers with poor training increase the share of low
performers, whereas experienced teachers reduce it. A 10 percent increase in absenteeism
raises our measure of educational outcome by 1.38 percentage points (signicant at the
1 percent level). Hence the identied cultural e¤ects on absenteeism (rst stage) will
transform into educational outcome. Table 5 also reveals important culture e¤ects at
the second stage. Home support in a Romanic district is signicantly lower, whereas it
is higher when the majority language is French. The number of children, by contrast,
does not have a signicant e¤ect on school performance, holding school attendance and
expenditure constant. This suggests that a quality-quantity trade-o¤does not materialize
through home support.
We nd a very large religion e¤ect. A purely Catholic district has on average a 9.1
percentage points higher share of low performers than a Protestant district (holding school
resources and absenteeism constant). The magnitude of this e¤ect is comparable with a
120 percent increase in expenditure (while holding expenditure structure constant). The
impact of Primary is statistically and economically less signicant. A one standard
deviation increase in Primary raises the share of low performers by 1.4 (= 15:7  0:088)
40Columns (3)-(5) also show that conservatism is distinguishable from the state of development (agri-
cultural share). Therefore we have four relevant identities (language, religion, conservatism and the state
of development) which   in combination with their interactions   inuence the educational production.
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percentage points. Column (2) includes an interaction between Primary and Catholics.
The estimated coe¢ cient is positive but insignicant. Thus the state of development
has more inuence on absenteeism than on home support (and moderates the religion
e¤ect on absenteeism more than the religion e¤ect on home support). Columns (3)-(5)
further examine the interactions between the Catholic share and the voting behavior.
The interactions with the votes on the Factory Lawand the easing of civil marriage
are signicantly negative, whereas the interaction with the votes on the death penalty is
signicantly positive (at the ve percent level). For instance, we estimate that in case of an
increase of the Catholic share of one the share of low performers is 19 (= 8:1+22:4 0:487)
percentage points higher than in a district with 100 percent Protestants, if the law on civil
marriage was fully rejected. But if 85 percent of the voters supported the civil marriage,
religion has no e¤ect. Thus, once again, the political attitude strongly qualies the impact
of religion. In columns (6)-(8), we control simultaneously for Catholics  Primary and
the interaction between Catholics and the voting behavior. Again, we nd that the
interaction with the votes on the referenda have the expected sign and are statistically
signicant for the factory law (at the ve percent level) and for the civil marriage (at the
one percent level). Note that CatholicsPrimary remains insignicant (although having
the expected sign). Thus the moderating e¤ect of the state of development is less evident
than those of the political attitude. In contrast to the rst stage, the direct e¤ect of
Catholics remains signicant if interaction e¤ects are included. In a district with a mean
approval of the referenda and with a mean agricultural labor share, there is a signicant
e¤ect of religion on home support. But in highly progressive districts, the religion e¤ect
will cease to exist. An F-test over the joint signicance of the three interaction coe¢ cients
is rejected at the 10 percent level (not reported in the Table) which again conrms our
main hypothesis that Catholicism loses its importance for educational performance in a
non-conservative milieu.
Comparing the results of the rst and second stage, we see that the cultural e¤ects,
including their interactions, work in opposite directions. Pupils in Catholic and rural
districts on average attend school more often, but receive less home support. These
opposite directions are explained by our theory which explicitly accounts for strength of
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punishment as a separate cultural determinant of education, in addition to value assigned
to education as such. Overall, the e¤ect of home support prevails. While, on average, the
absenteeism channel reduces the share of low performers in a (purely) Catholic district
by 1.8 (= 0:138  12:8) percentage points, recall that the home support channel raises the
share of low performers (on average) by 9.1 percentage points. Column (9) shows that,
also at the second stage, a squared Catholic share is statistically not signicant. This
again suggests that the signicant interactions between religious and other sociocultural
factors do not merely reect a non-linear Catholic e¤ect.
5.4 E¤ect of religion on expenditure
So far, we have examined the e¤ects of cultural variables on educational performance
through school attendance and home support, and we found that the Catholic share has
a strong inuence in a conservative district, but has no (or even a reversed) impact when
the district is progressive. The aim of this subsection is to analyze whether the political
attitude also qualies the e¤ect of religion on expenditure. As suggested by part (ii) of
Proposition 2, we run the following regression
log gi;t = 0 + 1i;t + x
0
i;tx + z
0
i;tz + 2ni;t + 
0
t +  i;t: (13)
Following our theoretical model, regression (13) focuses on the question whether culture
a¤ects the voterswillingness to pay for schools, assuming that the school administration
spends the provided money according to the structure observed in z. As a robustness
check, we also run the regression
log gi;t = 0 + 1i;t + x
0
i;tx + 2ni;t + 
0
t + i;t; (14)
which assumes that voters are ignorant of the observed input structure. Table 6 and 7
show the results of these regressions.
<Table 6>
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In column (1) of Table 6, we see that less economically advanced districts (Primary
is high) have lower school expenditure per pupil. This is in line with the positive impact
of an increase in productivity A on g derived in Proposition 2. A standard deviation
increase in the agricultural share lowers school expenditure by 11 (= 123:80:088) percent.
The number of children matters, as well. School expenditure per child decreases in the
number of children signicantly. This supports the idea that a quality-quantity trade-
o¤ works through willingness to pay for schooling in addition to the channel through
which a higher fraction of children in the population raises absenteeism from school.
Cultural variables have an e¤ect, too. Romanic and Italian districts have around 30
percent less school expenditure than German districts. And on average, we estimate that a
purely Catholic district has 17.6 percent lower school expenditure than a purely Protestant
district.41 As suggested by our theoretical considerations, the e¤ects on home support
and expenditure go in the same direction, whereas absenteeism is driven by an additional
force (sanctions). In column (2), we again introduce an interaction between Catholics
and Primary. We nd that Catholics  Primary is negative and signicant at the one
percent level. Thus the state of development substantially qualies the e¤ect of religion
on expenditure. For a district whose agricultural share lies at the rst decile (Primary =
 0:111), we estimate no di¤erence in expenditure levels between Catholic and Protestant
districts. This suggests that religion does not a¤ect human capital formation through the
expenditure channel either if the economy is su¢ ciently developed (neither did it through
absenteeism and home support). In contrast, if the agricultural share of the district
lies at the ninth decile (Primary = 0:114), we predict a 33 percent di¤erence in school
expenditure between Catholics and Protestants. Columns (3)-(5) consider interactions
between the Catholic share and the political attitude. All interactions are signicant (at
least at the 10 percent level) and have the expected sign. In column (4) the direct Catholic
e¤ect gets insignicant. This suggests that given a mean support of the law on civil
marriage, religious denomination does not a¤ect school expenditure. Hence, the result of
column (1) that a purely Catholic district has on average 17.6 percent less school spending
41Combined with the e¤ect of expenditure on educational outcome (Tab. 5) this di¤erence will (on
average) increase the share of low performers in a Catholic district by 1.3 (= 17:6  0:075) percentage
points.
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must be fully driven by conservativedistricts. If the introduction of civil marriage was
fully rejected, we estimate a 56 (=  7:3  0:487  99:2) percent di¤erence in expenditure
between a purely Catholic and a purely Protestant district. This would account for a 3.1
(= 56  0:056) percentage points di¤erence in the share of low performers (use column (4)
in Tab. 5). In columns (6)-(8), we additionally control for Catholics  Primary. The
coe¢ cient of this interaction is again negative and, except for column (7), signicant at
the ve percent level. The interactions with the voting behavior always have the expected
sign and is in the case of the civil marriage, signicant at the one percent level. Including
all three political interactions simultaneously and running an F-test reveals that they
are jointly signicant at a one percent level (not reported). Column (9) shows that the
squared Catholic share is not signicant.
<Table 7>
Table 7 analyzes the cultural e¤ects when voters are ignorant of the observed input
structure. The results are similar to those of Table 6. Romanic, Italian, Catholic and
less developed districts spend signicantly less on schooling. An interaction between
Primary and Catholics highly qualies the e¤ect of religion (column (2)). Similarly,
the interactions between Catholics and Y esCivil and between Catholics and Y esDeath
are signicant at the one percent level. Unlike the other regressions, a squared Catholic
share is signicantly negative. This is the only case where we found that the signicant
interactions could be driven by a non-linear religion e¤ect.
6 Conclusion
Our research sheds light on the conditions and mechanisms under which religion may be
an important determinant of human capital formation, and therefore of economic devel-
opment. We have analyzed a unique and rich data set covering 169 Swiss districts in the
last quarter of the 19th century (the phase of the second industrialization), which contains
comparable measures of educational outcomes (results from pedagogical examinations of
conscripts), sociocultural indicators, standard school inputs as commonly employed in the
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literature on educational production, and a measure of school attendance. Sociocultural
indicators include voting results from political referenda which capture the extent of pro-
gressive movements and conservatism. We examine three channels (school attendance,
home support and school expenditure) through which culture can e¤ect the educational
outcome. The results show that religion works through all these three channels, but only
when conservative political attitudes are prevalent. The evidence suggests that neglecting
the interaction of religious denomination with these measures of political attitudes leads
to misleading conclusions about the role of religion for human capital formation. Our
results demonstrate that religious denomination ceases to have impact on educational
performance if, at the same time, progressive movements are widely supported.
Our results also suggest that economic development, in the sense of structural change
away from agricultural production, mitigates the overall harmful e¤ect that Catholicism
has, on average, on human capital formation. This potentially gives rise to a virtuous circle
between structural change and education: Any economic policy conducive to structural
change leads to better educational outcomes in Catholic regions and thereby fosters further
development. Thus, rather than concluding that some economies are doomed to failure
due to their cultural heritage, our evidence suggests that in economies with unfavorable
cultural characteristics, policies designed to promote growth could be particularly helpful.
Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1 and 2
We rst prove Proposition 2. Using (6)-(8) in (10), we get for the optimization problem
max
E;e;g
log (Ah  g) +  log (h)  ' (e+ (1 + d)E)   (1  E) (15)
subject to (5) and E  1. The rst-order condition for E can be written in the form
Ah
Ah  g +  
E
{
(' (1 + d)   ) ; (16)
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with equality if E < 1. The rst-order conditions for e and g can be written as
Ah
Ah  g +  =
'e
1  { , (17)
Ah
Ah  g +  =
g
{ (Ah  g) , (18)
respectively. (18) implies that
Ah
g
=
1 + {
{ (1 + )
. (19)
The second-order conditions are straightforward. Note rst that (17) and (18) imply

Ah
g
  1

'e =
1  {
{
. (20)
Solving (19) and (20) for e gives
e =
1 + 
'
. (21)
Substituting (5) for h into (19), we get
g =

A
(1 + ){
(1 + {)
e(1 {)E{Q(z)
 1
1 {
. (22)
For E = 1, (21) and (22) gives us
g =
"
A
(1 + )2 { {
'1 { (1 + {)
Q(z)
# 1
1 {
, (23)
which increases in A and . For E < 1, Ah
Ah g +  =
E

' (1 + d)    , according to (16).
Combining this with (18), we get

Ah
g
  1

E (' (1 + d)   ) = 1. Thus, with (19) we get
E =
(1 + ){
(1  {) (' (1 + d)   ) . (24)
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With (21) and (24), the expression in (22) becomes
g =
"
A
(1 + )2 {1+{
'1 { (1 + {) (1  {){

1
' (1 + d)   
{
Q(z)
# 1
1 {
. (25)
Comparative-static results of Proposition 2 immediately follow from (21), (24) and (25),
if there is absenteeism. If E = 1, expressions (21) and (23) for e and g, respectively, are
relevant.
For  = 0 and  = 0, (21), (24) and (25) reduce to
E =
{
(1  {)' (1 + d) , (26)
e =
1
'
, (27)
g =

A
{1+{
'1 { (1  {){

1
' (1 + d)
{
Q(z)
 1
1 {
. (28)
If E = 1, then g = [A{Q(z)]
1
1 {
'
, according to (23). The comparative-static results of
Proposition 1 then follow from these equations. QED
B. Data sources
 Pedagogical examinations: Statistisches Bureau des eidgenössischen Departement
des Innern, Schweizerische Statistik, Lieferungen 27 (1876), 34 (1877), 36 (1878),
38 (1879), 61 (1885), 64 (1886), 67 (1886), 71 (1888), 75 (1889), 120 (1899), 124
(1900), 129 (1901), 134 (1901), 138 (1903).
 School inputs: Kinkelin (1875), Grob (1883), Huber (1897).
 Results from political referenda: forthcoming at www.sidos.ch.
 Census information: Statistisches Bureau des eidgenössischen Departement des In-
nern, Schweizerische Statistik.
Primary sector share: Lieferungen 28 (1876), 59 (1884), 97 (1894).
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Catholic share, majority language: Lieferungen 15 (1872), 51 (1891), 84 (1892).
Ratio of children (aged 0-15): Lieferungen 20 (1874), 56 (1883), 88 (1892).
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Tab. 1: Summary statistics 
     
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Weeks [s] 37.556 5.990 22.835 48.484
ClassSize [logm] 3.938 0.310 2.643 5.159
Capital [logk] 5.355 0.637 2.767 7.035
PoorTr 0.070 0.144 0.000 1.000
Female 0.273 0.225 0.000 0.857
Clerics 0.052 0.148 0.000 0.872
Experience>20 0.287 0.123 0.000 0.778
Age>40 0.301 0.125 0.000 0.778
Expenditure [logg] 3.068 0.507 1.548 4.711
Absenteeism [loga] 2.665 0.615 0.278 4.274
Catholics 0.436 0.412 0.001 1.000
Children [n] 0.324 0.031 0.224 0.425
Primary [µ] 0.000 0.088 -0.212 0.261
YesFactory 0.000 0.205 -0.427 0.373
YesCivil 0.000 0.249 -0.487 0.483
YesDeath 0.000 0.210 -0.453 0.467
Distance [d] 0.043 0.047 0.000 0.301
LowPerf 0.213 0.155 0.013 0.696
Notes: Pooled over periods (493 observations). LowPerf is the average share of conscripts who failed in Reading, Essay, Math and History. Primary, YesFactory, 
YesDeath, YesCivil are mean subtracted. The respective mean values are 0.217, 0.497, 0.533, 0.487. Definitions of other variables are provided in the main text. 
  
 
Tab. 2: Correlation coefficients 
       
(a): Cultural variables 
       
 Catholics YesFactory YesCivil YesDeath   
Catholics 1.000      
YesFactory -0.095** 1.000     
YesCivil -0.6802*** 0.3797*** 1.000    
YesDeath 0.4897*** -0.1965*** -0.7861*** 1.000   
German -0.0758* 0.5007*** 0.2582*** 0.124***   
       
(b): Catholic share and non-cultural indicators 
       
 Catholics Primary [µ] LowPerf 
Expenditure 
[logg] 
Absenteeism 
[loga]  
Catholics 1.000      
Primary [µ] 0.3162*** 1.000     
LowPerf 0.1862*** 0.2264*** 1.000    
Expenditure [logg] -0.3913*** -0.5494*** -0.6041*** 1.000   
Absenteeism [loga] -0.3755*** -0.319*** 0.0597 0.2945*** 1.000  
Children [n] -0.2465*** 0.0734 0.0167 -0.1638*** 0.1904***  
Notes: Data pooled over periods. See notes to Tab. 1 for the definition of LowPerf; other variables are defined in the main text.  
*** significant at, or below, 1 percent, ** significant at, or below, 5 percent, * significant at, or below, 10 percent. 
  
 
Tab. 4: First stage results 
Dependent variable: Absenteeism [log(a)] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. 
Weeks 0.012 ** -0.001 0.008  0.005 0.009  0.005 0.009 * 0.005 0.011 ** 0.005 0.006  0.005 0.008  0.005 0.008  0.005 0.009 * 0.005 
Class Size -0.070  0.287 -0.039  0.105 -0.078  0.111 -0.055  0.105 -0.064  0.108 -0.030  0.108 -0.039  0.104 -0.041  0.105 -0.031  0.105 
Capital -0.025  0.121 -0.028  0.047 -0.008  0.050 0.006  0.048 -0.006  0.049 -0.023  0.049 -0.006  0.048 -0.015  0.048 -0.042  0.048 
Poor Training -0.690 *** 1.008 -0.659 *** 0.154 -0.657 *** 0.158 -0.610 *** 0.154 -0.607 *** 0.160 -0.640 *** 0.154 -0.613 *** 0.152 -0.622 *** 0.155 -0.657 *** 0.154 
Female Teachers 0.851 *** -0.494 0.980 *** 0.174 0.872 *** 0.179 0.998 *** 0.174 0.949 *** 0.181 0.978 *** 0.174 1.040 *** 0.173 1.025 *** 0.177 1.044 *** 0.184 
Clerics -0.733 *** 1.176 -0.996 *** 0.219 -0.922 *** 0.229 -0.783 *** 0.218 -0.764 *** 0.225 -1.133 *** 0.225 -0.943 *** 0.220 -1.009 *** 0.224 -1.003 *** 0.219 
Length of Service > 20 Years 0.016  0.813 -0.153  0.401 -0.096  0.414 -0.040  0.401 -0.029  0.411 -0.217  0.401 -0.137  0.397 -0.156  0.401 -0.140  0.402 
Age > 40 Years 0.691 * 0.112 0.756 * 0.388 0.785 ** 0.400 0.730 * 0.389 0.676 * 0.398 0.810 ** 0.388 0.762 ** 0.384 0.734 * 0.388 0.769 ** 0.388 
Expenditure 0.317 *** -0.157 0.229 *** 0.079 0.287 *** 0.080 0.191 ** 0.080 0.287 *** 0.080 0.208 *** 0.079 0.170 ** 0.079 0.223 *** 0.079 0.222 *** 0.079 
Romanic 0.035  0.314 -0.065  0.169 -0.007  0.175 -0.090  0.170 -0.011  0.174 -0.104  0.171 -0.119  0.168 -0.073  0.170 -0.097  0.172 
Italian 0.009  0.247 0.030  0.124 0.056  0.135 -0.185  0.130 -0.188  0.146 0.088  0.131 -0.113  0.130 -0.049  0.145 0.013  0.125 
French 0.387 *** -0.232 0.375 *** 0.075 0.393 *** 0.088 0.283 *** 0.079 0.323 *** 0.079 0.404 *** 0.086 0.307 *** 0.078 0.344 *** 0.077 0.364 *** 0.076 
Catholics -0.128 * 0.261 -0.087  0.064 -0.101  0.067 -0.033  0.083 -0.094  0.072 -0.071  0.065 -0.033  0.082 -0.086  0.070 0.296  0.359 
Catholics squared                                 -0.392  0.362 
Children 4.506 *** 0.811 3.593 *** 0.798 4.876 *** 0.830 4.523 *** 0.783 4.454 *** 0.804 3.821 *** 0.826 3.906 *** 0.792 3.654 *** 0.799 3.763 *** 0.813 
Primary -1.379 *** 0.336 0.220  0.421 -1.538 *** 0.342 -1.476 *** 0.353 -1.366 *** 0.346 0.061  0.438 -0.373  0.466 0.051  0.436 0.310  0.429 
Catholic*Primary     -3.826 *** 0.644            -3.651 *** 0.652 -2.564 *** 0.718 -3.503 *** 0.684 -3.755 *** 0.647 
Distance 2.482 *** 0.523 2.378 *** 0.505 2.504 *** 0.520 2.638 *** 0.507 2.791 *** 0.526 2.423 *** 0.505 2.522 *** 0.502 2.533 *** 0.515 2.365 *** 0.505 
Constant -0.054  0.640 0.538  0.626 -0.025  0.635 0.250  0.620 0.006  0.634 0.533  0.624 0.555  0.618 0.512  0.626 0.469  0.629 
YesFactory         -0.411 ** 0.203         -0.222  0.200               
Catholic*YesFactory         0.814 *** 0.268         0.593 ** 0.263               
YesCivil            -0.796 *** 0.173          -0.552 *** 0.184           
Catholic*YesCivil            1.765 *** 0.302          1.231 *** 0.333           
YesDeath                0.499 *** 0.187          0.287  0.187      
Catholic*YesDeath                         -1.034 *** 0.314             -0.479   0.324       
Number of Observations 493 493 493 493 493 493 493 493 493 
R2 0.51 0.55 0.52 0.55 0.52 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.55 
Notes: Standard errors adjusted for intragroup correlation. Time structure (see also Tab. 3): School inputs and absenteeism for 1871/72, 1881/82, 1894/95, corresponding to Catholic share, agricultural 
share and number of children for 1870, 1880, 1888, respectively; language dummies: German is left-out category; Primary, YesFactory, YesCivil and YesDeath are mean subtracted. *** significant at, or 
below, 1 percent, ** significant at, or below, 5 percent, * significant at, or below, 10 percent. 
  
 
Tab. 5: Second stage results 
Dependent variable: LowPerf 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. 
Weeks -0.003 *** 0.001 -0.003 ** 0.001 -0.002 ** 0.001 -0.003 ** 0.001 -0.003 *** 0.001 -0.002 ** 0.001 -0.003 ** 0.001 -0.003 ** 0.001 -0.003 ** 0.001 
Class Size 0.055 ** 0.023 0.053 ** 0.023 0.051 ** 0.023 0.053 ** 0.021 0.054 ** 0.021 0.047 ** 0.023 0.052 ** 0.021 0.053 ** 0.021 0.052 ** 0.023 
Capital -0.012  0.012 -0.012  0.012 -0.013  0.011 -0.017  0.012 -0.016  0.012 -0.012  0.011 -0.017  0.012 -0.015  0.012 -0.011  0.012 
Poor Training 0.128 *** 0.038 0.128 *** 0.038 0.121 *** 0.036 0.113 *** 0.032 0.106 *** 0.030 0.121 *** 0.036 0.114 *** 0.033 0.111 *** 0.032 0.128 *** 0.038 
Female Teachers -0.068  0.044 -0.083  0.050 -0.063  0.043 -0.081 * 0.046 -0.069 * 0.041 -0.075  0.049 -0.084 * 0.049 -0.080 * 0.046 -0.089  0.055 
Clerics -0.006  0.043 0.021  0.053 0.024  0.049 -0.003  0.042 -0.009  0.040 0.044  0.057 0.004  0.048 0.012  0.048 0.022  0.053 
Length of Service > 20 Years -0.216 ** 0.098 -0.200 ** 0.099 -0.201 ** 0.096 -0.209 ** 0.093 -0.211 ** 0.092 -0.191 ** 0.097 -0.206 ** 0.094 -0.202 ** 0.094 -0.201 ** 0.100 
Age > 40 Years 0.107  0.097 0.098  0.101 0.099  0.094 0.108  0.094 0.122  0.091 0.095  0.097 0.106  0.095 0.115  0.095 0.097  0.102 
Expenditure -0.075 *** 0.022 -0.068 *** 0.020 -0.067 *** 0.021 -0.056 *** 0.019 -0.066 *** 0.020 -0.062 *** 0.019 -0.056 *** 0.019 -0.063 *** 0.020 -0.067 *** 0.020 
Romanic 0.044 *** 0.017 0.053 *** 0.019 0.055 *** 0.018 0.060 *** 0.020 0.049 *** 0.017 0.063 *** 0.019 0.061 *** 0.020 0.053 *** 0.018 0.056 *** 0.021 
Italian -0.012  0.021 -0.014  0.024 -0.028  0.022 0.012  0.024 0.009  0.026 -0.031  0.024 0.009  0.025 0.002  0.027 -0.013  0.024 
French -0.051 ** 0.021 -0.052 ** 0.022 -0.059 *** 0.022 -0.034 * 0.018 -0.036 ** 0.018 -0.061 *** 0.023 -0.036 * 0.019 -0.040 ** 0.020 -0.051 ** 0.021 
Catholics 0.091 *** 0.015 0.088 *** 0.015 0.087 *** 0.015 0.081 *** 0.018 0.088 *** 0.016 0.085 *** 0.015 0.081 *** 0.018 0.088 *** 0.016 0.053  0.091 
Catholics squared                                 0.036  0.092 
Children -0.151  0.278 -0.085  0.256 -0.161  0.273 -0.121  0.256 -0.074  0.239 -0.087  0.250 -0.105  0.248 -0.048  0.234 -0.103  0.265 
Primary 0.157 * 0.090 0.016  0.095 0.165 * 0.091 0.166 * 0.088 0.143 * 0.078 0.037  0.098 0.126  0.100 0.059  0.090 0.007  0.097 
Catholic*Primary      0.350  0.218            0.302  0.204 0.098  0.176 0.229  0.194 0.346  0.216 
Absenteeism 0.138 *** 0.039 0.142 *** 0.041 0.133 *** 0.036 0.131 *** 0.034 0.122 *** 0.031 0.136 *** 0.037 0.133 *** 0.036 0.128 *** 0.036 0.143 *** 0.041 
Constant 0.231 * 0.124 0.177  0.129 0.226 * 0.123 0.193  0.123 0.224 * 0.117 0.180  0.126 0.181  0.125 0.191  0.122 0.183  0.129 
YesFactory         0.039  0.043         0.025  0.042             
Catholic*YesFactory         -0.129 ** 0.054         -0.113 ** 0.053             
YesCivil            0.108 *** 0.040          0.100 *** 0.038         
Catholic*YesCivil            -0.224 ** 0.086          -0.207 *** 0.080         
YesDeath                -0.078 ** 0.037          -0.067 * 0.038      
Catholic*YesDeath                         0.132 ** 0.064             0.102   0.063       
Number of Observations 493 493 493 493 493 493 493 493 493 
R2 0.75 0.74 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.74 
Notes: Standard errors adjusted for intragroup correlation. Time structure (see also Tab. 3): School inputs and absenteeism for 1871/72, 1881/82, 1894/95, corresponding to Catholic share, agricultural 
share and number of children for 1870, 1880, 1888 and dependent variable (see notes to Tab. 1) averaged for 1875-79, 1885-89, 1899-1903, respectively; language dummies: German is left-out 
category; Primary, YesFactory, YesCivil and YesDeath are mean subtracted. *** significant at, or below, 1 percent, ** significant at, or below, 5 percent, * significant at, or below, 10 percent. 
  
 
Tab. 6: Effects on expenditure, controlling for expenditure structure 
Dependent variable: Expenditure [Log(g)] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. 
Weeks 0.019 *** 0.004 0.017 *** 0.004 0.017 *** 0.004 0.017 *** 0.004 0.019 *** 0.004 0.016 *** 0.004 0.016 *** 0.004 0.017 *** 0.004 0.018 *** 0.004 
Class Size -0.306 *** 0.093 -0.283 *** 0.087 -0.285 *** 0.095 -0.274 *** 0.085 -0.298 *** 0.092 -0.257 *** 0.088 -0.268 *** 0.084 -0.281 *** 0.087 -0.273 *** 0.087 
Capital 0.233 *** 0.034 0.224 *** 0.035 0.228 *** 0.034 0.223 *** 0.035 0.233 *** 0.035 0.215 *** 0.035 0.219 *** 0.035 0.225 *** 0.035 0.209 *** 0.034 
Poor Training 0.183 ** 0.082 0.188 ** 0.090 0.192 ** 0.080 0.220 *** 0.082 0.215 ** 0.083 0.192 ** 0.088 0.218 ** 0.086 0.202 ** 0.089 0.188 ** 0.089 
Female Teachers 0.287 ** 0.133 0.329 ** 0.132 0.278 ** 0.132 0.341 ** 0.134 0.314 ** 0.138 0.313 ** 0.133 0.350 *** 0.133 0.338 ** 0.134 0.390 *** 0.147 
Clerics -0.976 *** 0.136 -1.052 *** 0.133 -1.060 *** 0.141 -0.891 *** 0.129 -0.950 *** 0.138 -1.115 *** 0.137 -0.933 *** 0.132 -1.035 *** 0.138 -1.053 *** 0.134 
Length of Service > 20 Years 0.385  0.273 0.305  0.286 0.333  0.264 0.305  0.263 0.353  0.268 0.275  0.272 0.278  0.272 0.297  0.283 0.317  0.285 
Age > 40 Years 0.040  0.263 0.062  0.278 0.074  0.247 0.087  0.254 0.049  0.258 0.079  0.260 0.094  0.261 0.064  0.275 0.073  0.276 
Romanic -0.349 *** 0.093 -0.377 *** 0.099 -0.378 *** 0.097 -0.396 *** 0.101 -0.366 *** 0.094 -0.406 ** 0.101 -0.402 *** 0.105 -0.382 *** 0.100 -0.406 *** 0.104 
Italian -0.294 *** 0.101 -0.275 *** 0.101 -0.237 ** 0.101 -0.396 *** 0.094 -0.380 *** 0.105 -0.216 ** 0.101 -0.374 *** 0.096 -0.314 *** 0.102 -0.289 *** 0.101 
French -0.169 *** 0.052 -0.169 *** 0.048 -0.134 ** 0.062 -0.197 *** 0.052 -0.189 *** 0.051 -0.125 *** 0.059 -0.190 *** 0.051 -0.178 *** 0.049 -0.179 *** 0.049 
Catholics -0.176 *** 0.047 -0.154 *** 0.047 -0.162 *** 0.046 -0.073  0.060 -0.150 *** 0.052 -0.145 *** 0.046 -0.076  0.058 -0.145 *** 0.049 0.237  0.274 
Catholics squared                                 -0.388  0.272 
Children -2.366 *** 0.662 -2.666 *** 0.689 -2.232 *** 0.704 -2.163 *** 0.677 -2.329 *** 0.668 -2.600 *** 0.736 -2.329 *** 0.695 -2.624 *** 0.695 -2.483 *** 0.692 
Primary -1.238 *** 0.247 -0.545 * 0.324 -1.254 *** 0.263 -1.091 *** 0.268 -1.183 *** 0.262 -0.564  0.350 -0.783 ** 0.348 -0.578 * 0.344 -0.453  0.330 
Catholic*Primary     -1.557 *** 0.575            -1.487 ** 0.597 -0.703  0.626 -1.429 ** 0.609 -1.476 ** 0.571 
Constant 2.790 *** 0.507 2.932 *** 0.512 2.753 *** 0.506 2.770 *** 0.495 2.781 *** 0.507 2.893 *** 0.515 2.847 *** 0.506 2.916 *** 0.515 2.843 *** 0.517 
YesFactory         -0.106  0.153         -0.024  0.151                
Catholic*YesFactory         0.395 ** 0.182         0.293  0.182                
YesCivil            -0.334 *** 0.116          -0.265 ** 0.120           
Catholic*YesCivil            0.992 *** 0.207          0.840 *** 0.224           
YesDeath                 0.154  0.124           0.069  0.123      
Catholic*YesDeath                 -0.406 * 0.220           -0.179  0.217      
Number of Observations 493 493 493 493 493 493 493 493 493 
R2 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.77 0.77 
Notes: Standard errors adjusted for intragroup correlation. Time structure (see also Tab. 3): School inputs and absenteeism for 1871/72, 1881/82, 1894/95, corresponding to Catholic share, agricultural 
share and number of children for 1870, 1880, 1888 and dependent variable (see notes to Tab. 1) averaged for 1875-79, 1885-89, 1899-1903, respectively; language dummies: German is left-out 
category; Primary, YesFactory, YesCivil and YesDeath are mean subtracted. *** significant at, or below, 1 percent, ** significant at, or below, 5 percent, * significant at, or below, 10 percent. 
 
  
 
Tab. 7: Effects on expenditure, not controlling for expenditure structure 
Dependent variable: Expenditure [Log(g)] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. 
Romanic -0.375 *** 0.063 -0.389 *** 0.085 -0.462 *** 0.081 -0.453 *** 0.105 -0.427 *** 0.085 -0.488 *** 0.102 -0.454 *** 0.116 -0.434 *** 0.104 -0.528 *** 0.104 
Italian -0.148 *** 0.078 -0.062  0.103 -0.063  0.078 -0.324 *** 0.083 -0.388 *** 0.120 0.001  0.102 -0.271 *** 0.101 -0.270 * 0.141 -0.048  0.098 
French 0.014  0.045 0.032  0.043 0.085  0.052 0.024  0.050 -0.018  0.043 0.102 ** 0.049 0.042  0.059 0.004  0.043 0.037  0.041 
Catholics -0.436 *** 0.062 -0.402 *** 0.066 -0.440 *** 0.063 -0.087  0.086 -0.295 *** 0.077 -0.409 *** 0.064 -0.091  0.083 -0.293 *** 0.070 0.703 ** 0.297 
Catholics squared                                 -1.110 *** 0.314 
Children -4.866 *** 0.700 -4.957 *** 0.722 -4.958 *** 0.762 -3.780 *** 0.700 -4.519 *** 0.704 -5.215 *** 0.792 -3.945 *** 0.710 -4.718 *** 0.724 -3.970 *** 0.716 
Primary -2.056 *** 0.311 -0.957 ** 0.390 -1.888 *** 0.343 -1.405 *** 0.353 -1.766 *** 0.356 -0.729 * 0.428 -0.900 ** 0.431 -0.894 ** 0.443 -0.761 * 0.396 
Catholic*Primary     -2.329 *** 0.698            -2.408 *** 0.714 -1.085  0.751 -1.900 ** 0.791 -1.991 *** 0.681 
Constant 4.499 *** 0.237 4.525 *** 0.243 4.505 *** 0.253 4.112 *** 0.241 4.385 *** 0.238 4.586 *** 0.265 4.152 *** 0.243 4.439 *** 0.243 4.127 *** 0.244 
YesFactory         0.248  0.201         0.376 * 0.192                
Catholic*YesFactory         0.132  0.280         -0.090  0.288                
YesCivil            -0.214  0.140          -0.099  0.142           
Catholic*YesCivil            1.619 *** 0.280          1.381 *** 0.327           
YesDeath                0.118  0.158           -0.014  0.163      
Catholic*YesDeath                    -0.895 *** 0.333             -0.587  0.363       
Number of Observations 493 493 493 493 493 493 493 493 493 
R2 0.61 0.64 0.62 0.68 0.63 0.65 0.68 0.65 0.64 
Notes: Standard errors adjusted for intragroup correlation. Time structure (see also Tab. 3): Absenteeism for 1871/72, 1881/82, 1894/95, corresponding to Catholic share, agricultural share and number 
of children for 1870, 1880, 1888 and dependent variable (see notes to Tab. 1) averaged for 1875-79, 1885-89, 1899-1903, respectively; language dummies: German is left-out category; Primary, 
YesFactory, YesCivil and YesDeath are mean subtracted. *** significant at, or below, 1 percent, ** significant at, or below, 5 percent, * significant at, or below, 10 percent. 
